Contemporary concerns about the difficulties faced by the Japanese economy following the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 soon appeared to be unfounded as the economy recovered relatively quickly. This paper suggests that despite its limited impact on Japan's longer term economic trajectory this disaster can tell us a great deal about the ways in which individuals, organisations and officialdom respond to a devastating event, and help us better to understand the process of transition from immediate relief to longer term recovery, not just in Japan, but more broadly. It analyses the impact of the disaster on market transactions, showing that the scale and nature of market disruption went far beyond direct physical destruction, that the collective and individual responses of government, producers, traders and consumers had the potential to make matters worse, rather than better, and that the existence of integrated markets spread the effects of the disaster across the Japanese archipelago. It also suggests that re-establishing market stability following the crisis was one of the keys to longer term recovery, and further research will help us understand the causal factors in that process.
4 widely its impact. Despite its 'relative backwardness', Japan had long been developing sophisticated market institutions. There were complex markets for labour, for capital, for raw materials and energy, for agricultural products, and for intermediate and final manufactured goods. By 1923 Japan's domestic markets were relatively integrated and centralised, and the country had become increasingly integrated into the international economy. Because market institutions are also social institutions, transmission of the effects of the disaster depended not merely on factors such as loss of supply or physical damage, but also on individual psychology and the culturally and socially conditioned responses of people and organisations.
Scholars such as Shimizu & Fujimura (2010) and Kimura (2011) have highlighted aspects of the immediate disruption to market transactions, and the concerns expressed at the time of the disaster seemed frequently to border on panic. The location directly affected by the earthquake, namely Japan's largest metropolitan area, embracing the country's political capital, its economic and financial centre, and its main export port, magnified the potential for wider transmission of the impact of the destruction. For some contemporaries it was difficult to imagine a scenario more likely to jeopardise the hard won economic gains of previous decades. 'The disaster….apparently arrested, as was apprehended at the time, the progress of national development ' (Bureau of Social Affairs 1926, preface, n.p.) . This profound concern was strongly associated with a fear that market dislocation would jeopardise longer-term recovery, and a shared belief that the state must intervene to compensate for the inability of individuals and businesses to cope on their own, and to constrain the 'unreliable' market-based responses to the emergency. Two weeks after the disaster, on 16 th September, emergency regulations stated:
5 'What calls for special apprehension is that taking advantage of this unparalleled natural calamity that has befallen the nation, individual merchants…..may indulge in the practice of cornering or secretly hoarding the stocks of necessities of living for the selfish purpose of profiteering at the expense of the numberless sufferers. ' (Bureau of Social Affairs 1926: 552) A 1924 report from the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce stated that the disaster 'has almost completely destroyed the foundations of the capital's economic organisation', while 'the rights and relationships of those engaged in commerce have been thrown into extreme confusion and disorder ' (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924: 24, 30) .
In this article I suggest that contemporary fears that unchecked dislocation of markets was potentially disastrous were both understandable and legitimate. In line with the now accepted distinction between direct and indirect costs of disasters (Hallegatte & Przyluski 2010: 3) I present historical evidence showing that the scale and nature of short-term market disruption was far greater than that stemming simply from physical destruction. I show how the collective and individual responses of government, producers, traders and consumers could magnify the problems. The article also suggests, however, that the existence of an integrated market economy such as Japan had developed by the 1920s offered some benefits in the wake of the disaster. Market-based transactions could help in alleviating immediate suffering, procuring reconstruction goods and rebuilding production. Judicious intervention by the state in the process of market stabilisation following the catastrophe may also have enhanced the chances of longer term recovery. Focussing on market institutions therefore allows us to some extent to reconcile the profound concerns of contemporaries with the more positive long term economic story. It can thereby help 6 us understand the broader process of recovery from disasters in Japan itself, and in developing economies more resembling pre-war Japan.
In line with this focus the remainder of the paper seeks to answer four main 
The Disaster and the Market
The 1923 earthquake, estimated at 7.9 on the Moment Magnitude scale (M w ) with an epicentre just south of the capital area, occurred just before noon on 1 st September, 1923 . In the words of one contemporary, 'the quivering, shaking, rattling became in an instant like a raging tempest' (Dahlmann, 1924, 7) . Seismologists recorded over 900 aftershocks over the next few days, and the devastation has been well documented in photographs and written assessment (see eg. Naimushō Shakaikyoku 1926). The majority of deaths that occurred were caused not by the earthquake and associated tsunami, but by the more than 130 separate fires that took hold within minutes of the earthquake, merging into devastating conflagrations and firestorms. Estimates of the human loss varied considerably, but the final figure given by the authorities was over 156,000 killed, injured or missing (Bureau of Social Affairs 1926, 43, 53) . Large swathes of the urban area were left almost devoid of recognisable buildings; many remaining structures were unusable. All but tiny 7 patches of urban Yokohama ceased to exist (Imai 2007; Norma 2008 Calculating the value of what was lost has proved an inexact science. Tomikashi (1982 Tomikashi ( , 1983 and Matsuda (1983) concur with Ōkawa's estimate of the value of losses at around 1.6% GNP, but some more recent estimates have put it somewhat higher. Tokyo city government estimated that the total material losses, at some 5.5 billion yen, were 'at least sevenfold those of San Francisco in 1906', comprising mainly about 2.7 billion yen worth of buildings and furniture, and around 2.37 billion yen worth of factories, merchandise and warehoused goods. The Home
Ministry's enumeration of the physical destruction shows that all the major department stores were wiped out, while 5748 bank or company buildings in Tokyo and Yokohama were wholly or partially destroyed. Loss of production facilities included 1438 flour milling establishments, 264 dyeing workshops, 366 confectionery producers and over 400 factories engaged in lumber processing or wood/bamboo manufacturing (Bureau of Social Affairs 1926, 83-5, 180, 466-9) . The authorities in Tokyo estimated that over three-quarters of machinery capacity was lost or damaged, and over two-thirds of the capital's capacity for the production of food and drink (Tomikashi 1983, 2) . The scale of destruction alone had the capacity to change dramatically the demand and supply curves for a whole range of goods, and to engineer acute shortages and consequent price rises.
Evaluations of the direct physical loss underestimate the costs to the economy, which were increased considerably by the indirect effects of the damage,
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and by the market dislocation that ensued. These additional problems had two main sources. One was the extensive damage inflicted on the infrastructure necessary for production and the performance of market transactions. The second was the temporary breakdown of both formal and informal institutions that had previously helped to minimise the transactions costs in different markets.
Efficient markets and commercial transactions are dependent on the provision of both informational and physical (transport) infrastructure, as well as on the provision of basic utilities. Such provision was badly damaged by the September 1 st disaster, with 'all communication and traffic systems within the city limits having been entirely dislocated and completely paralysed by the quake for several days following'
(Bureau of Social Affairs 1926, 67). Gas and electricity supplies were reduced or non-existent, and in many areas there was a danger of acute water shortages (Tōkyō-fu 1925 vol.3, 69; Jiji Shinpōsha Keizaibu 1924, 529-53) . For around a week there was virtually no communication between the devastated area and other parts of Japan. Hundreds of post offices were destroyed, tens of thousands of telegraph poles, and miles of wiring. Much of the national postal, telephone and telegraph network was routed through Tokyo, so the destruction affected users across the country. Full resumption of telephone services, increasingly used by business, was expected to take up to two years. Businessmen in Tsu, in Mie Prefecture, some 300 kilometres away from Tokyo, reported in late November that there were still huge delays in phone communication, and that telegraphs were taking up to three days to arrive, which rather defeated their purpose (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924, 224) .
Damage to the transport facilities on which both information flow and market transactions were dependent impeded for months any resumption of normality. Rail routes into the Kantō region had been cut, including the key Tōkaidō and Nakasendō 9 lines. Great lengths of track, including rails, sleepers and points, were unusable.
Physical destruction of rolling stock ran to over a hundred steam engines and thousands of passenger and freight wagons (Jiji Shinpōsha Keizaibu 1924, 179-84 At the same time the loss of personnel and retail outlets itself undermined the capacity to undertake transactions. Sales took place in the informal markets that sprang up, but one survey conducted in November 1924, over a year after the disaster, found that the number of people employed in commerce in Tokyo city and the six affected prefectures was down by almost a quarter, and employment in some other sectors was down by up to 16% (Shakaikyoku 1924, 122) . Much of the documentation relating to the issue of credit and other legal arrangements for commercial activities had been destroyed, and banks were among the many businesses that had problems in identifying who their creditors and debtors were.
Many businesses, small and large, found it impossible to obtain the credit that they needed to tide themselves over the crisis period. Others were compelled to abandon longstanding commercial relationships with businesses that no longer existed, or could not maintain supplies. Turning to new partners posed its own challenges in establishing a relationship of trust. The lack of credit combined with the lack of confidence led to a renewed dependence on cash dealings; for a while hard cash replaced many bills of exchange and other forms of credit and payment methods throughout the disaster area.
Loss of business and personal documentation was just one of the things that contributed to confusion over the rights and relationships between commercial actors and an overwhelming lack of trust and business confidence. The organisations that helped business, large and small, to coordinate their activities and protect their collective interests were in some cases unable to continue functioning, whether due to the destruction of facilities, death or injury of individuals, or inability to communicate. Many of the main business organisations in Kantō, such as the Yokohama Silk Exporters' Association, acted rapidly to resume such activities as were possible, but this was often due to the initiative of particular individuals and in the face of great difficulties. It was particularly hard for many of the small and medium sized businesses that comprised the vast majority of business undertakings in 1920s Japan to obtain support and coordinate their efforts for recovery. Many family businesses had lost both home and business premises, and stock, and faced a bleak future. The foundations essential to market operation in the Kantō area thus appeared distinctly shaky in the early days after the disaster, and the state of 'extreme confusion and disorder' seemed likely to spread to other parts of the country.
Government Intervention to Stabilise Markets
Analysts of disasters have long argued that effective governing institutions are a major element in post-disaster reconstruction, both through direct intervention and indirectly through shaping the private sector response (Noy 2009, p.227) . In Japan the state's responsibilities to support citizens exposed to disasters was well established by the late 19 th century, and in 1923 the central and municipal authorities were quick to step in to try and minimise the threat of political, economic and social disorder, although they initially failed to control the violence against ethnic minorities and political dissenters. The government's initial attempts to regulate market transactions were made with a view to short term relief and reconstruction, rather than from any concern with longer term economic stability, but there is little doubt that the authorities at all levels were aware of the potential severity of the economic problems. In fact, we find that many of the ensuing interventions accorded with more recent post-disaster policy prescriptions.
In conjunction with the imposition of martial law and establishment of the As the urgency of requisitioning for immediate relief began to subside, the authorities became aware that the sympathy and support that many survivors seemed prepared to exhibit when the emergency was at its height (see eg. Davison 1931, 40) were in some cases being overruled by a basic human instinct to profit from the misfortunes of others. As long as the government's role in transactions was restricted to emergency provision for the relief effort, retail and private market transactions, normally unregulated, had the potential to exacerbate rather than ameliorate some shortages. Ceilings were therefore placed on the price of some traded goods, and on 7 th September the government instituted an anti-profiteering ordinance. Anyone found guilty of profiteering in necessary commodities (what was necessary not always being spelt out) could be punished by up to three years' imprisonment or a fine of up to 3,000 yen. Excessive profit was deemed to be 'for the time being a rise of over 30% compared with the pre-quake price' (Keishichō 1925, 605) . Despite the ordinance there were continuing complaints that a growing number of merchants 'were greedy for excess profits', and policemen were advised that the worst cases of profiteering should be dealt with very strictly to deter others tempted to behave in similar fashion (Keishichō 1925:614, 619) . Police authorities had some flexibility in applying the ordinance, and some were accused of being overzealous.
The writer Kita Sadakichi described how the police beat up a women selling nashi (Japanese pears) in front of his house, trampling her merchandise, and hit and kicked a rice merchant who was selling potatoes from Kawagoe at a lower price than that in the public market (Kita 1923: 262) . Efforts to capitalise on rising prices and 14 shortages continued to occur, adding to the frictions and uncertainties already generated by the catastrophe. One individual was reported to have been seriously injured in a case of profiteering related to a box of Morinaga caramels (Jiji Shinpōsha Keizaibu 1924: 626) . By the end of October 1923 there had been 422 arrests for profiteering; most cases were related to the pricing of construction materials, followed by foodstuffs (Keishichō, 1925: 622) . It is difficult to judge exactly how effective the anti-profiteering legislation was. Overenthusiastic claims on the part of the police were to be expected, but the available evidence is insufficient to indicate how far actual violations were detected. The limited price rises for provision goods (kyōkyū busshi), discussed later in this paper, may suggest that some sellers were deterred from raising their prices unduly, but may also indicate that the government was effective in ensuring supplies of these goods.
Easing of shortages was the objective of an additional measure, the suspension or reduction of import tariffs on a range of goods for six months through until the end of March 1924. The main items for which tariffs were suspended were foodstuffs, such as grain, meat, eggs and condensed milk; household necessities;
and materials for reconstruction, such as lumber. This was a more indirect way than the requisitioning and anti-profiteering measures of trying to influence the availability of goods for sale in the market, and the prices that those goods would command. It meant that those involved in transactions relating to these goods could choose how to respond to the incentives offered by the tariff suspension. There is no doubt that in the case of commodities such as timber suspension of the import tariff helped encourage imports of badly needed goods, in the process preventing prices from rising unduly (Nōshōmushō Sanrinkyoku 1924) . At the same time the measure was also relatively undiscriminating, and concerns were expressed that increased imports would damage domestic producers by undercutting their prices.
Addressing the credit and liquidity problems consequent on the disaster was also identified as a government responsibility. A one-month moratorium for the settlement of commercial bills and repayment of debts was introduced for those living or running a business in the affected area. The objective of the moratorium was to address the difficulties that many victims of the quake experienced in obtaining funds to pay their bills and the reluctance of banks and financial institutions to advance credit given the uncertainties of the situation. The moratorium was followed by so-called 'earthquake bills', whereby the Bank of Japan was obliged to purchase commercial bills accepted by banks in order to provide the banks with greater liquidity. As Shimizu and Fujimura (2010: 308) point out, however, while this measure was successful in re-engineering the resumption of credit and protecting the financial system, a dangerous element of moral hazard was introduced, as the Bank of Japan had no way of discriminating sound bills from unsound ones. The net result was delay in much needed restructuring of weak financial institutions, and a major shake-out through the financial crisis of 1927 (Nihon Ginkō Hyakunenshi Hensan Iinkai, 1983) .
Finally, the government demonstrated its commitment to rebuilding as fast as possible the nation's transport and communications structure and restoring water and energy supplies. With much of the infrastructure state-owned, the obligation to rebuild lay clearly with the government. Without rapid state action goods could not be transported from one place to another, and the flow of information essential to the efficient functioning of markets was impeded. Without clean water and sewage the health of survivors was in jeopardy. Even where the private sector was involved, as 16 in the case of energy, a coordinating role by the state was needed to help surviving businesses re-engage in production or obtain essential inputs. In restoring the infrastructure required for the functioning of markets, the government's achievements were impressive. Within a week there was a limited resumption of postal services in central Tokyo, and by the middle of September all delivery offices in the city were offering some kind of service (Yūseishō Yūmukyoku 1991, 122) .
Much of the telegraph system was working by the end of October, and a full service had been resumed by mid-December. The Kantō telephone service was gradually rebuilt from late September, and telephone contact with other cities recommenced 
Relying on the Market
The fundamental issue for market operation after September 1 st was the major shifts in supply and demand generated by the disaster. While the government showed itself willing to curb free market responses to this changed situation, it never sought to dispense with market activity. Producers, traders and consumers continued to respond to market signals according to what they deemed to be their own best interests, whether or not a market was subject to any official regulation. Government intervention merely constrained some opportunities and changed the incentive structure. This fundamental was highlighted by the leading Tokyo-based economic journal, Tōyō Keizai Shinpō, which on resuming publication in early October Nov.1923 Dec.1923 Jan.1924 Feb.1924 Mar.1924 Apr.1924 May.1924 Jun.1924 Jul.1924 Aug.1924 Sept.1924 Oct.1924 Nov.1924 Dec.1924 Jan.1925 Feb.1925 Mar.1925 Apr.1925 May.1925 Jun.1925 Jul.1925 Aug.1925 Sept.1925 Oct.1925 Nov.1923 Dec.1923 Jan.1924 Feb.1924 Mar.1924 Apr.1924 May.1924 Jun.1924 Jul.1924 Aug.1924 Sept.1924 Oct.1924 Nov.1924 Dec.1924 Jan.1925 Feb.1925 Mar.1925 Apr.1925 May.1925 Jun.1925 Jul.1925 Aug.1925 Sept.1925 Oct.1925 However, despite concerns that suspending import tariffs for foodgrains would undercut Japanese agricultural production, that damage to infrastructure and marketing institutions and organisations would impede recovery, and the fact that electricity shortages impeded the production of polished rice, it does seem that the interventions may have helped curb damaging short-term price rises and ensure supplies to the affected area. Probably more important in the longer term, though, was the fact that by mid-October a run of good weather was suggesting a harvest something above the long term average (Tōyō Keizai Shinpō 1069, 13/10/1923, 590).
Instability in the market for wood products proved somewhat more intractable.
Tokyo was primarily a city of wood, and the post-quake fires had consumed acres of wooden buildings. Of the 420 lumber wholesalers affiliated to the Tokyo Lumber Wholesalers' Federation only two were completely unscathed, and losses of stocks 20 were immense. In Yokohama, for example, estimates suggested that over 80% of wood stocks had been destroyed (Nōrinshō Sanrinkyoku 1924, 13, 22) . Sawmill capacity in Tokyo fell by around 95% (Jiji Shinpōsha Keizaibu 1924, 33) . Despite the extensive use of wooden building making the capital area acutely vulnerable to fires, the cities of Tokyo and Yokohama, especially when it came to residential construction, were largely rebuilt in wood (Clancey 2006, 222) . Timber was seen as a key reconstruction material and prioritised by the government in the emergency requisitioning and tariff measures as it sought to secure much needed supplies from both domestic and foreign sources. Securing these supplies, however, took time.
Large scale domestic purchases were hindered by transport difficulties, while supplies from North America encouraged by the tariff suspension could not arrive for several months. The immediate shortage pushed up prices. The government tried to impose price ceilings, but these were difficult to enforce. It was reported that many traders made huge profits, not least by using false names to avoid the restrictions of impacted by the disaster, in ways that could be damaging to a region's economic prosperity, but could also be beneficial and offer new opportunities. These ripple effects were not limited to large economic hubs such as Ōsaka or Kōbe, but were also felt in remote rural regions. Geographic distance from the devastation was no guarantee of insulation. While regions closest to the capital area were more likely to experience a greater impact, even distant parts of the archipelago felt at least some effects of the disaster in the Tokyo metropolitan area.
The ways in which the ripples spread through the operation of markets were diverse. If we take as one example the Shizuoka area, relatively close to Tokyo, we find that although the prefecture suffered some significant direct physical damage from the tremor and the tsunami, its subsequent economic problems were greatly magnified by more indirect impacts of the dislocation in the metropolitan districts to which the Shizuoka economy was so closely tied. Shizuoka's two main export products, tea and lacquerware, were shipped exclusively through the port of Yokohama, and producers in Shizuoka incurred large stock losses through the fire.
Obtaining reimbursement for the destroyed stocks proved problematic, and without payment producers lacked the credit to make or market further goods, or generate income from replacement exports. Domestic demand for these core products temporarily collapsed, so the loss of exports could not be compensated for by sales within Japan. Like many other regions, Shizuoka also suffered from rising prices of building materials, as limited supplies were siphoned off to Tokyo and Yokohama.
Construction in the prefecture was further hindered by a shortage of skilled construction workers, since these workers could earn significantly higher wages by joining the rebuilding effort in Tokyo (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924, 165-73) .
Some agriculturists engaged in sericultural by-employment suffered, as for a time little raw silk was exported, and the low cocoon prices offered by filatures left producers unable to dispose of their stocks (Bureau of Social Affairs 1926, 258, 269) . These disruptions proved to be relatively short-term, but there was one more lasting effect. Deprived of the services of Kantō intermediaries through whom they had traditionally marketed products such as lacquerware and dolls to domestic markets, some Shizuoka producers resorted to direct marketing techniques. This shift appears to have accentuated a trend towards more direct dealings between producer and consumer and was sustained even after the immediate crisis was over (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924, 165-73) .
The impact of the disaster on Hokkaidō's coal producers has already been mentioned, and despite its distance from Tokyo this northern region felt the economic impact of the disaster in a variety of ways. Hokkaidō had long been tied to both domestic and overseas markets through the axis of Tokyo. Most producer and consumer goods purchased in the island were supplied from Kantō, while locally produced goods from Hokkaidō and the Tōhoku region were marketed through Kantō. Goods destined for these northern areas, or supplied by them, travelled over long distances, whether by rail or sea. As we have seen, shipping capacity was diminished through destruction and requisitioning, and costs rose. Rail problems led to a massive piling up in Aomori of goods destined for Hokkaidō, and of Hokkaidō products destined for areas further south (Tetsudōshō 1927) . Northeastern Japan was also negatively affected by the upsurge of demand in the Tokyo-Yokohama area for some key reconstruction products, and the rising prices that went with it, drawing into the capital area goods and labour that might otherwise have been consumed or utilised in the regions that produced them. For a time after the quake Hokkaidō, a major domestic source of timber, actually suffered from a shortage of wood (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924, 43-97; Nōshōmushō Sanrinkyoku 1924, 75ff.) .
Hokkaidō farmers were also among those who feared that tariff suspension would undercut domestic production. Hokkaidō was the centre of Japan's small dairy industry, and the influx of condensed milk for baby food from the United States, both through aid and through tariff exemptions, generated vocal protests from the region Regions in the western half of Japan traditionally within the economic remit of the Kansai plain were also affected. These areas had fewer direct commercial dealings with Kantō, and the ripple effect was therefore more limited, but there is 27 evidence that even here suppliers increased their output in response to price rises in the disaster area. As far away as Shikoku and Kyūshū chambers of commerce reported an increase in cash dealings, and fewer longer term credit transactions, suggesting that the lack of confidence and the liquidity problems had spread out from the centre to distant parts of the country. While the reality of commercial transactions and business trust in Kyūshū may have changed little, there seems little doubt that the psychological impact of the shock in such an era of financial centralisation was a major one (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924, 299, 309-46) .
But what of the Kansai area that seemed best placed to seize the economic initiative and gain from the disaster to its main competitor? One Diet member, Kiyose Ichirō, openly argued that the capital should be moved to Ōsaka Yokohama, which exported the raw silk so crucial to Japan's balance of trade, held the largest share by value (Tōyō Keizai Nenkan, yearly). Kōbe, which had long campaigned in vain for formal recognition as Japan's second silk-exporting port, saw the destruction of Yokohama as an opportunity for increasing its share of this lucrative trade. Raw silk could still be shipped from the main area of production in Shinshū, and the increasing importance of silk production in western central Japan, such as in Gifu, strengthened Kōbe's case. Some regarded as deplorable attempts by Kōbe to benefit from Yokohama's tragedy (eg. Ōtsuka 1924, 12) , but the months after the earthquake were characterised by a sustained campaign by Kōbe interests to get a more permanent share of this valuable export trade, and a counter campaign by those in Yokohama who were seriously concerned that Kōbe was trying to encroach on the port's traditional dominance (Jiji Shinpōsha Keizaibu 1924, 485-528) .
In fact, contemporary reports suggest overwhelmingly that while there was a shift in the economic balance towards the Kansai and Nagoya areas immediately after the disaster, it was relatively short-lived. Traders and producers in these areas The potential for change existed, but the will for change was more limited.
One key factor, perhaps, is the evidence that many economic actors took a conservative view of the situation, expressing themselves desirous of returning to the old (pre-quake) ways of doing things. The nature of Japan's domestic markets and patterns of consumption posed practical problems for both producers and
consumers. An east-west divide was reflected in comments from northeastern
Japan that the quality and nature of the goods that could be obtained from the western half of the country were different from those in the east, and hence it was impossible to purchase exactly what was required. Variation in local products and the persistence of niche markets also meant that production for the Kantō and northeastern markets by manufacturers who traditionally sold their products in western Japan required considerable product modification. Businessmen in Hiroshima, for example, emphasized that it would be easy to send more charcoal to Kantō, but different specifications for the Tokyo market would mean changing their furnace design, which was both difficult and costly (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924, 283-4) .
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At the core of the conservative views articulated by many was a feeling on both sides that familiar ways of doing things with familiar trading partners were the basis of commercial trust, and creating such relationships with new partners, often using different commercial practices, was a long and difficult process. A report from the Chamber of Commerce in Yamagata in mid-January 1924 noted how differences in the commercial practices of Kansai merchants led to mistakes in transactions and disparities between sample goods and those that then arrived. Yamagata merchants were among those who raised serious questions about the commercial morality of producers and traders from the Kansai area (Nōshōmushō Shōmukyoku 1924, 112 Moreover, a number of the measures taken by the Japanese authorities in 1923, such as infrastructure reconstruction and provision of liquidity, were those that economists specialising in disasters have identified as important for short-term relief and longer term recovery.
Whatever the case, government action was not by itself sufficient to put the market economy back on track. Equally important was the re-establishment of market institutions and commercial trust. The direct economic effects of physical destruction and human casualties were exacerbated by the shock, the lack of information, the stress and uncertainty that followed on the disaster. seem, however, that the more complex and integrated a market system is, the greater the likelihood that the impact of a disaster will be communicated well beyond the disaster area. The 1923 disaster disrupted the US silk industry, but in most respects its impact was national. The global supply chain problems generated by Japanese natural disasters since 2000 have provided a further demonstration of the ways in which a shock to production and marketing in one good or one region can spread to a host of others. While every disaster is distinct, and the 1923 one was set apart even in disaster-prone Japan by its scale and its location, it can nevertheless provide us with insights on the shared aspects of impact and response that are likely to be of importance in post-disaster economic recovery.
Despite extensive analysis of exogenous shocks and the fluctuating fortunes of the Japanese economy in the interwar period, the market instability immediately following the Great Kantō Earthquake has received relatively little attention, and we still know relatively little about the process of Japan's post-disaster recovery. This paper has suggested that while the 1923 disaster had a limited impact on Japan's longer term economic trajectory, part of its economic historical importance lies in the fact that it can tell us a great deal about the ways in which individuals, organisations and officialdom respond to a devastating disaster, and help us better to understand the process of transition from immediate relief to longer term recovery. A considerable amount of research is still needed to identify the causal factors in this transition, but the evidence strongly suggests that market stability mattered for that process, and that understanding these processes of stabilisation is likely to be of wider significance.
